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U.S. Once Felt It Had a Trophy in K.G.B. Man

By JOEL BRINKLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 — To American intelligence officials, Vitaly Yurchenko's defection had seemed an extraordinary coup, a signal that the tide in the ideological war turning in favor of the United States.

Just last week, officials were calling Mr. Yurchenko a new breed of defector who left because he was disillusioned with Communism, not because he was in trouble or in debt.

Before his redefection, a White House official, speaking of Mr. Yurchenko and other recent defectors, said: "It certainly has caught the attention of senior people in Government, the difference between these cases and the ones of the past."

But today, officials at the Central Intelligence Agency said they were stunned and perplexed.

"We just don't know what happened," an official said.

The prevailing view seemed to be that Mr. Yurchenko was a genuine defector who had changed his mind. But some members of Congress, briefed on the situation, said they believed Mr. Yurchenko had been sent here by the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

As Government officials try to answer the unanswered questions, they say the incident has added another reversal to what has been a turbulent year in the intelligence business.

It is difficult to know which side is winning the espionage war. An intelligence official said the redefection "is a scoop" for the Russians.

"It is sensational," he added. "But in the long run, it probably won't be that important."

The original defection of Mr. Yurchenko and of other Soviet intelligence officers, including Oleg Gordiyevsky, who was the K.G.B. station chief in London, had led to a striking change in attitude among American officials.

Through the summer, the prevailing mood had been gloom after the disclo-

sures about the Walker family spy ring, the latest and largest in a series of damaging espionage cases. But that turned to surprise and satisfaction over the Soviet defections.

Not only were Mr. Yurchenko and Mr. Gordiyevsky senior intelligence officers, but information from their debriefings indicated they were unlike previous defectors.

"These guys are 'the new Soviet man,'" an official said last week. "They are able, capable, privileged men who were doing very well in the Soviet system. Both were colonels up for promotion to flag rank."

Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, the New York Democrat who was vice chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee until early this year, said before Mr. Yurchenko redefected: "These are the ones who are given the nice homes, the fake Persian rugs, free vodka and their own Volga."

Disillusionment a Factor

Intelligence officials found that striking, they said. But even more important, they said, the two men, particularly Mr. Yurchenko, were telling interrogators that they had left the Soviet Union largely for ideological reasons.

"It is disillusionment," Senator Dave Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Select Committee, said recently. "They have come to the conclusion that their system just does not work. This is specific information from the debriefings."

About the same time, a White House official said of the defectors:

"They have not come out speaking of the broad struggles of men and character, of communism versus democracy. They are saying their system is screwed up, corrupted. They are cynical."

Mr. Gordiyevsky defected to Britain in August, and said disillusionment was part of the motivation, Senator Durenberger said. Mr. Gordiyevsky's views apparently have not changed.

With Mr. Yurchenko, "disillusionment was clearly the dominant factor," according to interrogators, Senator Durenberger said.

Officials said previous defectors had not mentioned disillusionment.

"I have never seen a political defector in 30 years," Harry Rositzke, a former C.I.A. officer, said today.

Richard M. Helms, who served in the C.I.A. from 1947 to 1973, when he resigned as director of Central Intelligence, said: "During my time in the agency, I don't recall a single defector who came here for ideological reasons. It was always girlfriends or money problems, or they got in trouble for one reason or another."

The Americans drew conclusions from Mr. Yurchenko's statements.

Two weeks ago, William E. Colby, who was Director of Central Intelligence during the middle 1970's, said:

"If we had had defections of three senior C.I.A. officers to the Soviet Union, this country would be in an uproar. What this seems to signal is a change in appeal, from the 50's and 60's, when Westerners found appeal in their society, to a time when they are finding appeal in ours."

Colby Sees a Change of Heart

Today Mr. Colby said he was not sure the redefection changed that conclusion. He said it was possible that Mr. Yurchenko had been planted to confuse American intelligence.

Mr. Colby said he believed Mr. Yurchenko "was probably legitimate" and "went through the psychological trauma" that many defectors undergo, "separating themselves from their family and their country."

If Mr. Yurchenko was lying all along, a White House official said, "he was very clever."

"His responses were very sophisticated and reasonable," the official said, referring to the debriefings.

Another intelligence source, representing an opposing view, said he believed Mr. Yurchenko had been lying from the start.

"The ideological business is nonsense," he said. "He came here because he had a girlfriend."

After defecting, officials said, Mr. Yurchenko visited a woman in Canada with whom he had been involved while stationed at the Soviet Embassy here from 1975 to 1980. But she sent him away, the Americans said.

Mr. Yurchenko and Mr. Gordiyevsky were only the best known of several recent defectors. Sergei Bokhan, deputy director of Soviet military intelligence in Athens, defected in May. Senator Durenberger said there had been other defections that had not been disclosed.

22 December 1986 1985

Scientist, ex-CIA chief urge U.S. to consider Soviet test-ban offer

By Joseph Bauman

Deseret News environmental specialist

The Soviet Union's offer of an agreement ending nuclear-weapons tests poses a unique opportunity, say a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the widely acclaimed "father of radiation health physics."

This might be a chance to end the nuclear arms race, according to William E. Colby, who directed the CIA from 1973 through 1975, and Dr. Carl Z. Morgan, for 50 years a physics pioneer.

Colby and Morgan visited the Deseret News Saturday afternoon to make the case for acceptance of the latest Soviet offers of a comprehensive test ban. They were accompanied by members of the anti-nuclear-testing group, Downwinders, which arranged their visit to the state.

In 1943, Morgan's research helped launch American nuclear health physics, a science he led for its first decades. He was the Health Physics Society's first president, editing the group's journal for a quarter of a century. He has written at least 350 scientific articles.

Today, he is a member of Physicians for Social Responsibility — a group whose founders recently won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts on behalf of a worldwide nuclear freeze. In 1962, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to a ban on atmospheric testing, but underground tests continue.

American underground tests at the Nevada Test Site have been known to vent, allowing huge amounts of radiation to escape into the atmosphere.

In August, the Soviet Union launched a temporary halt in its subsurface nuclear blasts and said it could be extended beyond Jan. 1, 1986 if the United States would do the same. The offer was seen as a possible step toward a treaty banning such tests.

However, U.S. nuclear tests continue.

Recently, the Soviets offered to accept teams of visiting observers to verify that tests were not taking place, if a treaty could be achieved. The Reagan Administration rejected the offer on Thursday.

Morgan cited two main reasons that an end to underground testing is desirable: the dangers of both venting and of nuclear war.

"First of all, I believe that the people in

Utah and some of the neighboring states can see the inordinate, unnecessary exposure over the years from ionizing radiation — fallout." He recalled the now-familiar story of how the government made soothing statements during the period of above-ground testing, saying there was nothing to be concerned about.

In the meantime, "we found out the risks from exposure to radiation, in terms of carcinogenesis (causing cancer) are 10 to some 15 times what we thought 15 years ago."

"I think . . . all of us are far more concerned, though, about the escalation in the direction of a nuclear war, and the consequences."

He said he believes a ban on all nuclear tests might be impossible to achieve in his lifetime, but the Soviets' offers should be taken seriously.

"It's very frustrating now that our own government is apparently not willing to consider in earnest moving in that direction."

He said it is important to "release the pressure we have, moving toward a nuclear war." He called the situation today appalling.

Colby said the Soviets' offers are serious. "They start from the fact that they've got new management. He (the new Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev) has come in with a mandate to get Russia moving again."

The mandate is similar to the one President Kennedy had when he was elected in 1960, Colby said. To do this, Gorbachev is trying to improve the Soviets' bogged-down economy, and that takes money.

Gorbachev thinks he can use money to stimulate the economy, instead of pouring it into expensive weapons systems, according to Colby.

The Soviets have an interest in stop-

ping the Star Wars development because to keep up would take a giant chunk from their economy, he said.

What about the argument that if the arms race harms the Soviet economy, that's good for the United States?

That theory is not true, Colby said. He quoted a Soviet official as saying if necessary, his country would eat potatoes in order to keep up militarily.

They are determined not to be in a subordinate position. Trying to make their economy collapse won't work.

In the offers, "there's a lot of small print that's loaded in his favor, which is what you'd expect when you make a contract with a used-car dealer," Colby said. But if the offer were taken seriously, negotiations could start aimed at picking the undesirable small points out of the deal.

"If you also want to achieve an agreement, then you can get together and work the small print out."

If our sophisticated detection systems spot some unusual developments in the Soviet Union today — such as the possible deployment of new weapons systems — and U.S. officials asked for an explanation, the Soviets would say it's none of our business.

But under a treaty, this country could "demand satisfaction." The Soviets would have to convince America there was no violation of the treaty.

Verification teams could assist in the overall intelligence-gathering effort, checking all sources of information to see if the Soviets are testing systems banned by the treaty.

"You want that redundancy . . . If you can get more of these measurements, it's fine, get more," Colby said.

In order for the nuclear arms race to end, Morgan said, "I think we have to have a rising up of public opinion, as we did with atmospheric testing."

"We have this unique opportunity now, where the Soviets have imposed a moratorium," Colby said.

"We have been invited to join it. We could stop the development of nuclear weapons . . ."

COLBY

SALT LAKE CITY UT

The country's former CIA boss and a physicist who helped pioneer radiation health studies joined local anti-nuclear advocates in Salt Lake City to drum up public support for a nuclear test ban treaty.

William Colby, CIA director under Presidents Nixon and Ford, said during a Salt Lake City visit Saturday the Reagan administration should stop waffling on justifications for continued testing of nuclear weapons.

"At first we say 'no' to a test ban because we claim we don't have a way to verify it, which isn't so with our high technology," Colby said. "Then we say 'no' to the latest (Soviet test ban) offer on the grounds we need an opportunity to test reliability."

Colby's comments referred to the recent Soviet offer to allow observers inside the country to verify a proposed comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Nothing about the continued testing of nuclear weapons makes sense in a world poised on the brink of annihilation, Colby said.

"Nuclear weapons are unusable, a nuclear war is unwinnable, unilateral restraint is unworkable, and life in this world would be unliveable once the trigger is pulled," he said.

The former intelligence chief said the main block to grasping hold of the opportunity presented in recent Soviet concessions to on-site verification is the Reagan administration's love affair with "Star Wars," officially named the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Star Wars blueprint calls for developing a defensive nuclear umbrella over the United States that would detonate incoming missiles far out in space.

"Some say Star Wars could be 99 percent effective," Colby said. "Well, with roughly 8,000 strategic missiles at the ready, that still would leave room for 80 to get through, and possibly room for Salt Lake City to be targeted."

Dr. Karl Morgan, the Atlanta scientist who helped pioneer nuclear health physics, said even underground testing poses serious dangers of radiation exposure and increased risk of nuclear war.

While the U.S. government was assuring residents of southern Utah and neighboring states that above-ground testing during the 1950s was safe, scientists were discovering that the cancer risks from radiation exposure was 10 to 15 times greater than previously thought, Morgan said.

CIA Inspires Confidence Of Former Director

By The Tribune-Review

William Colby, director of the CIA under President Richard Nixon, believes the quality of American intelligence is so good as to "almost eliminate" the need for verification of Russian missile capabilities.

On top of this, he believes President Reagan should have responded more positively to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's offers concerning verification and other arms control matters. "Those offers reflected a major change in Soviet attitude," Colby said, "We shouldn't have turned them all down."

Speaking at a World Affairs Council "Noon Briefing" in Pittsburgh, Colby said a nuclear arms race is unwinnable, unilateral restraint is unworkable, and a world under the nuclear gun is "unlivable."

At an earlier press conference he said the arms race can and must be stopped through negotiations. "We are diverting too many re-

sources to the race, resources that could be used to reduce the deficit and solve more pressing problems," he said.

"There's a growing sense of unreality concerning nuclear missiles, while the threat grows stronger as the time between launch and impact grows shorter," he added. "The experts on this (nuclear war) seem to be out of control."

Colby also said he opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) because it was the "... wrong strategy, too expensive with ambiguous results." He said that no defense program could keep out all attacking missiles and that the small percentage that got through would still cause great damage.

Colby was joined later by Thomas Powers, a contributing editor of Atlantic magazine, also an SDI opponent. Both men spoke as members of the Committee for National Security at Carnegie-Mellon University. Powers outlined the "nuclear winter" effect

following a potential nuclear war.

Today the CIA "is the best intelligence unit in the world," Colby said. He admitted that following the Vietnam War and the Watergate episode, the CIA declin-

ed. But he claimed the agency has made a comeback — but it needs more manpower abroad.

"People do not realize the CIA goes far beyond spying. The agents gather intelligence (not all of a military nature) which is analyzed in a central location so that we can better understand the world," he said.

The agency has changed greatly, he reported, moving toward heavy use of technology — computers, listening devices, seismic equipment, etc. "We haven't had a strategic weapons surprise since Sputnik," he reported.

Colby is concerned about the recent leaks and surge in spy cases. Some of them could have a significant impact on security if the Russians "determine our sources," he said.

No longer are we in an age of the spy motivated by ideology, Colby said. Most of today's spies are "little people selling out for a few bucks," he added. Most people are no longer inspired by the "Soviet

model."

The increase in spy leak cases happens, Colby explained, "because we are doing a better job of detection." there are too many Soviet agents in the country, we offer an open society, and "because the mood of the country" has shifted toward anti-communism.

Colby claimed Yuri Andropov had vastly improved the KGB. He said, "We must pull up our socks on this leak business," via successful prosecution. He believes the number of Soviet "diplomats" and "visitors" should be reduced and that we "deal with the Soviets strictly on a reciprocal basis."

The definition of "secret" (classified materials) should be set by each administration, Colby suggested, because the variables threatening national security change.

Are there spy "moles" in the CIA? "We must assume there are moles and implement a vigorous security system, distributing information on a need-to-know basis only," he responded.

Do we spy on our friends? Colby was non-committal, except to say two questions were asked before such decisions were made — would the information gathered be valuable, and what are the risks involved? He said spying on Canada, for example, would not be worth the potential for bad reaction if the activities were discovered.

Colby, now a practicing attorney, said he believes in covert activities in foreign nations — even to the paramilitary level. "We (CIA) ran a full-scale war in Northern Laos for quite some time," he said. But these activities, according to Colby, must fall under the rules of war, which reject torture and assassination.

Do ideological or political trends dictate CIA activities? "National interests determine covert wars," he said. Of course, those interests may be set by "political preferences."

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SPYING AMONG FRIENDS

5 By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite

"Most of the world's 400 or more intelligence and security services are targeted to one degree or another on U.S. military, diplomatic and intelligence personnel, facilities, and technology. . . . One should remember, as some intelligence practitioners put it, there may be friendly countries, but there are only other intelligence services."

— Intelligence and Policy, by Roy Godson, 1985.

"We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."

— Lord Palmerston, 1848.

Israel, in recent days, has given fresh focus to what an American intelligence expert wrote just this year and a British statesman declared last century.

Israel today, much to its own embarrassment and confusion, stands accused of pursuing its own interests by paying an American spy to divulge the secrets of its staunchest supporter and richest patron.

If two such closely bound and beholden friends cannot trust each other, who can?

It is not the first time an ally has been caught spying on the United States, or that the United States has been accused of spying on an ally.

In 1954, the Dutch Embassy in Washington admitted receiving secrets from Joseph Sydney Petersen Jr., a research analyst at the top-secret National Security Agency. The Dutch said they thought the information transfer was authorized. Petersen pleaded guilty to unlawfully taking secret information and was sentenced to seven years.

In 1956, the United States reportedly monitored British code messages to keep abreast of developments during the United Kingdom's Suez Canal invasion. Communication interception, even among allies, has become almost routine.

In recent years, U.S. diplomats have been expelled from South Africa (1979) and Spain (this year) for allegedly spying.

The current Israeli case is particularly disturbing because of the closeness of the relationship. The question it provokes is: How common is the practice of ally spying on ally?

Intelligence experts agree that it certainly goes on when circumstances convince a government that the information it needs, albeit from an ally, can be acquired only by espionage. But they doubt that allies, particularly those formally aligned, as in NATO, routinely finance spying operations against each other.

"As the length of alliance and strength of alliance varies, you have greater and greater probability of having human agents [spies] being run against countries," says Jeffrey T. Richelson, an American University expert on intelligence who suggests, by way of illustration, that the United States would be less likely to spy on the British than to spy on the traditionally more independent French.

But he adds: "Even with the strongest and closest of allies you always have a certain amount of intelligence going on."

The Soviet Union, for example, is widely held to regard even its closest Warsaw Pact allies as intelligence targets. The United States, however, has generally preferred a system of close intelligence liaison, although this has been frequently compromised by leaks and security breakdowns in allied security services, notably the British.

Does the United States spy on its allies these days?

Richard Helms, a former CIA director, says: "In the world of espionage, usually allies don't spy on each other. On the other hand, there may come an occasion when something is going on in an allied country that it is in the national interest to find out about."

"And maybe the only way to find out would be doing a little bit of spying. But it would be done on a case-by-case basis."

William Colby, another former CIA director, says: "You can't answer that question. It's too hard to answer. Who are your allies? You have to look at the particular situation."

"You would be out of your mind if you spied on Canada. If you want to find

something out about Canada, go up and ask them. Other countries are more secretive about things."

Mr. Colby and other intelligence experts say the basic equation behind any decision to indulge in espionage against an ally is likely to be: Is the information to be obtained worth the potential of the acute embarrassment of discovery?

"Obviously, each nation is going to have to make its own decision about its own security. But when you do a secret operation in another country, you obviously have to weigh the value of the information you hope to get against the risk of being caught," says Mr. Colby.

"That means in many countries the impact would be so serious you wouldn't do it. But you also have a problem here of control of the intelligence services."

When the French secret service decided to sink the Greenpeace yacht in New Zealand earlier this year to scuttle a planned anti-nuclear protest at France's nuclear test ground in the Pacific, the blame was eventually laid on the defense minister and the chief of intelligence. Both lost their jobs in the diplomatic furor that engulfed the scandal.

It was not exactly spying, but it was a hostile intelligence action taken on friendly territory, and it shows the lengths to which intelligence services are prepared to go in pursuit of their own perceived interests.

Other documented examples of hostile intelligence activities among allies would be the South Korean and Filipino governments' activities against dissident groups residing in the United States — undertaken with official blessing of the foreign governments but despite U.S. protest.

In the Israeli case, the intelligence outfit allegedly responsible for retaining the U.S. spy was apparently operating without the knowledge of Prime Minister Shimon Peres and other Cabinet members. The potential of political embarrassment appears, therefore, to have been left out of the scales when the espionage decision was made.

According to one NATO ambassador based in Washington, intelligence services frequently operate in such an autonomous fashion that political leaders are not always privy to their activities.

In the United States, however, such loose-cannon activity is less likely. The intelligence services here are required by law to inform the congressional intelligence oversight committees of any particularly significant actions or developments. This puts clear political restraints — frequently resented — on them.

There is, of course, a fundamental difference between intelligence-gathering and spying. Every embassy, of an ally or an adversary, is in the business of snooping, of finding out as much as it legally can of what is happening in its host country. That is why embassies have political, economic and military experts to glean whatever information is available, to analyze trends, to dissect and

predict policies, to study personalities, to read every available tea leaf.

"What would our [intelligence] station chief do in Britain?" asks Richard H. Shultz, who teaches an intelligence course at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "Obviously he is going to be collecting a lot of open-source information. He is going to be working with his British counterparts against adversaries. Would he be recruiting British officials [to spy]? The answer is: I really doubt it."

Mr. Shultz says, "Generally, what your intelligence [operator] will do is attempt to identify people who can provide information that is helpful in terms of the external dynamics of a system. Do they really recruit them and pay them off in the ways the Israelis [allegedly] did? I don't think so. Generally, it's a little different. It's what is called in the trade 'having a close contact.' You don't have this guy in tow. You are not paying him. It's pretty deep in the background."

This is all diplomatically de rigueur. It stops short of illegal espionage.

But when you find, finance and control an agent who is channeling secret documents to you, you are spying.

That is what the Justice Department alleges Israeli intelligence officials did in the case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a Navy counter-terrorism expert.

The information Mr. Pollard allegedly sold to the Israelis — largely details of Arab military strengths, as perceived by the United States — has prompted some American Jews to suggest that it was the sort of intelligence the United States should have been willing to share with Israel anyway.

The problem here is that, in peacetime, the United States maintains close military contacts with some Arab nations, notably Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Indeed, so close is the current U.S. relationship with Egypt that three U.S. officers attached to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo accompanied the Egyptian commandos on their mission to Malta to try to rescue the passengers in the hijacked EgyptAir plane last month.

That sort of cooperation would be impossible if Egypt thought the United States was routinely passing along military information to the Israelis. Here U.S. national interests clearly take precedence over Israeli intelligence requirements — at least in peacetime.

The Israeli government has instigated its own inquiry into the Pollard affair, and it has promised to forward the results to the Reagan administration, and to return any documents illegally obtained. Despite its original "dismay" over the espionage case, the Reagan administration is still ready to take Israel at its word as a close and trusted ally.

Roy Godson, a Georgetown University expert, says, "The point is that in the history of international relations, allies have spied on each other. It would be remarkable if that didn't exist to some extent in the closing years of the 20th century."

Mr. Lewthwaite is a reporter in The Sun's Washington bureau.

Israel's apology

Israel's statement after two Americans were charged with spying for Israel, issued Sunday by Prime Minister Shimon Peres:

The Government of Israel is determined to spare no effort in investigating this case thoroughly and completely and in uncovering all the facts to the last detail no matter where the trail may lead. The full inquiry is still incomplete and therefore the Government of Israel is not yet in possession of all the facts; but the inquiry is progressing vigorously.

The Government of Israel assures the Government of the United States that in the wake of the inquiry, if the allegations are confirmed, those responsible will be brought to account, the unit involved in this activity will be completely and permanently dismantled, and necessary organizational steps will be taken to ensure that such activities are not repeated.

Our relations with the United States are based on solid foundations of deep friendship, close affinity and mutual trust. Spying on the United States stands in total contradiction to our policy. Such activity to the extent that it did take place was wrong and the Government of Israel apologizes. For the time being, we have nothing further to say on this.

THE SUN/CHARLES HAZARD

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MARY McGRORY

Fear of Seeming Wimpy

The people promoting an encore in Angola ought to get hold of "In Search of Enemies," the inside account of the original fiasco by John A. Stockwell, the former chief of the CIA Angola Task Force.

They need not fear they would enrich a snitch. The CIA was so exercised over Stockwell telling the whole appalling story of the Angolan operation that it took him to court—and won. His royalties go to the government, and his money may even now be being used to fund the kind of madness he so inexorably recounts.

But if those who want to do it all over again can't be persuaded to read his book, maybe they would study one paragraph. Stockwell is describing the impact of a Washington Post story in 1975, which revealed the presence of South African troops fighting with Jonas Savimbi, the head of UNITA, the guerrilla group that would benefit by an Angola replay.

"The propaganda and political war was lost in that stroke. There was nothing the Lusaka station [CIA headquarters in Zambia where the war was run] could invent that would be as damaging to the other side as our alliance with the hated South Africans was to our cause."

But we are poised to renew that alliance with the South Africans in Angola. The president artlessly revealed that he favors covert operations. Two congressmen, one an 85-year-old Democrat, the other an undeclared Republican presidential candidate, want overt aid and have boldly proposed a bill funding UNITA to the tune of \$27 million.

Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), the guardian of senior citizens, is frank, at least, about why he is sponsoring the return to folly. He never heard of Angola, he told a House committee, until his Cuban-American constituents called it to his attention. The presence of some 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola is an affront to the folks who spend

their lives thinking up ways to foil Fidel Castro. And Pepper responded with an alacrity that suggests that avidity to retain office is a quality that does not diminish with the passing years.

Cosponsor Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) denies any political motivation. He supports "freedom fighters" everywhere, he insists. Still, Angola offers him a wonderful chance to make up with the far-right of his party, which was outraged by his support of the South African sanctions. Conservatives cannot handle the idea that a Marxist government exists a world away.

The rabids went into orbit when Secretary of State George P. Shultz recently advocated holding off on aid until the United States could wear its mediator's hat a little longer. A State Department official met this week with a representative of the Angolan government to give him a last chance to settle with UNITA.

Rep. Matthew F. McHugh (D-N.Y.) rounded up 100 signatures on a letter to the president in which he said that either overt or covert aid "would damage our relations with governments throughout Africa."

The result in Congress is much in doubt. A Democrat, the late senator Frank Church, exposed the abuses of the CIA, which were, incidentally, being aired on Capitol Hill while the agency was pressing ahead with its Angolan intervention and William E. Colby, then the agency's director, was denying it. But today's Democrats have been thoroughly indoctrinated in the horrors of seeming wimpy on national security.

"Everyone is shopping around for freedom fighters to support," says Kirk O'Donnell, counsel to House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.).

McHugh hopes that some who voted to repeal the Clark Amendment, which forbade aid to covert operations or training for any Angolan movement without authorization by Congress, will draw the line on money that will prolong Angola's civil war. The head of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), one who said yes to repeal—on grounds the president should not be specifically hampered in any area of the world—is saying no on aid.

Everyone knows that in Angola the Nicaraguan formula will be used. That is, we give enough help to keep the war going but not enough to win it.

How House members from farm states are going to explain why they gave \$27 million to help somebody in the African bush when their own farmers are being foreclosed is not something they are thinking about.

But the chances that we will do it again—squander millions of dollars, hear hundreds of lies and ruin countless lives—are 50-50. Too many officeholders these days, when faced with a problem, begin by asking themselves, "What would Rambo do?"

7:00 P.M.

NBC-TV
Arms Control Verification

BROKAW: On Special Segment tonight, Verification: The countdown to Geneva. It's a key word in every arms control negotiation. In plain language, it means knowing whether the other side cheats.

NBC News Pentagon correspondent Fred Francis reports that with secret, high-technology spying, we know almost everything that the Soviet Union does.

FRED FRANCIS: The SR-71, the Blackbird, the fastest, highest-flying airplane in the world, with a set of cameras that can record photographic, infrared, and radar images.

And here, hidden in the Northern Virginia woods 15 miles south of the White House, a secret satellite ground station that receives a continuous stream of photographs from space.

And in Groton, Connecticut, Sturgeon Class submarines prepare for classified missions near Soviet naval bases. There they will take periscope photographs and record the sounds of Soviet subs.

And in the Great Smoky Mountains of North Carolina, another secret base that, among other things, monitors Soviet naval communications down to the walkie-talkie level.

Together, at ten billion dollars a year, it's a dizzying array of airplanes, submarines, satellites and radar, all making sure the Soviets keep their treaty commitments.

Mostly, though, we rely on photographs. Twenty-two times a day a Keyhole 11 photo-reconnaissance satellite scans the Soviet Union. In a few hours its pictures can be

flashed onto a screen at the Pentagon or put on the President's desk. They are computer-generated pictures of remarkable clarity, detailed enough to examine a tank, as in this simulation.

JOHN PIKE: You'd be able to spot something about the size of a grapefruit or a softball from an altitude of perhaps 80 or 100 miles.

FRANCIS: Only a handful of these satellite photos have ever been made public. This one of a Soviet aircraft carrier was taken from a slant angle 504 miles to the south of the shipyard.

WILLIAM COLBY: We don't trust them any more than you'd trust a secondhand car dealer. You watch it like a hawk. You do your own inspections. You check it over very carefully.

FRANCIS: Carefully means using more than photographs. When photo satellites detect Soviet launch preparation, that word is relayed to the National Security Agency outside

Washington. It alerts listening posts around the world.

Above the Soviet Union, satellites aim their sensors. In Turkey, the Air Force eavesdrops on the countdown. And around the Pacific, electronic equipment on remote islands, aboard converted 707s, and on a tracking ship await the splashdown, all recording electronic information.

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FBI reviews story about KGB murder

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By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The FBI is reviewing information supplied by Soviet KGB official Vitaly Yurchenko that Soviet agents abducted and murdered Nicholas Shadrin, a Soviet defector who turned double agent for the FBI and CIA and then disappeared, his wife, Blanka Shadrin, said in a recent interview.

But Mrs. Shadrin said she spoke to FBI officials last week and was told the FBI still believes Mr. Shadrin died in the hands of the KGB, despite Mr. Yurchenko's Nov. 2 redefection to the Soviet Union.

According to a secret State Department cable sent to the American Embassy in Moscow, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer lodged an official protest Oct. 28 with the Soviet Embassy's deputy chief of mission, Oleg Sokolov, on the KGB's murder of Mr. Shadrin in 1975.

A copy of the cable was obtained by The Washington Times.

Mr. Shadrin was a former Soviet destroyer captain who defected to the United States in 1959. He worked

for U.S. naval intelligence and was involved in a CIA attempt to help a Soviet KGB operative purportedly cooperating with U.S. authorities to move up in the ranks of the KGB hierarchy. In 1967, Mr. Shadrin, at the direction of the FBI and CIA, allowed the KGB operative, code-named "Igor," who was then in the United States, to recruit him into the KGB as a "double agent." Intelligence experts now believe Igor was only pretending to work for the United States in order to capture Mr. Shadrin.

Mrs. Shadrin said her husband had been under a Soviet death sentence since his defection.

"They took terrible advantage of my husband," Mrs. Shadrin said. "To let him go to Vienna without any protection is a criminal act."

As part of the plan to establish his credibility, FBI and CIA officials allowed Mr. Shadrin, a naturalized American citizen, to go to Vienna to meet KGB officials in 1972 and 1975. He never returned from the 1975 meeting.

Former CIA Director William Colby said recently in a television interview that the CIA was to blame

for Mr. Shadrin's abduction because it did not provide adequate surveillance to protect him in Vienna.

"The U.S. government has reliably learned that Nicholas George Shadrin . . . was abducted by representatives of the Soviet intelligence service (the KGB) on or about Dec. 28, 1975," the cable stated. "During the abduction of Shadrin, a chemical substance was forcefully administered to him, rendering him unconscious."

Intelligence sources have said the source for details about Mr. Shadrin's death was Mr. Yurchenko, although at a news conference at the Soviet Embassy here on Nov. 4, Mr. Yurchenko denied having ever heard of him.

The cable said that Mr. Shadrin was driven by the KGB toward the Hungarian border "but died before reaching the border, apparently as a direct result of the chemical substance forcefully applied to render him unconscious."

The State Department told Mr. Sokolov the abduction and murder were "reprehensible" and said there is no excuse for a government committing such acts.

"This case is particularly disturbing since the United States repeatedly asked for information in this case and was assured by high-level representatives of the Soviet Union that they had no information on Mr. Shadrin," the cable stated. The case was discussed between President Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1976.

Robert Kupperman, a friend of Mr. Shadrin, said that, despite Mr. Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union, he still believes Mr. Yurchenko's account of the fate of Mr. Shadrin.

Mr. Kupperman, a senior associate at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Mr. Shadrin clearly was a double agent. "The question is whether he was a triple agent" working for the Soviets all along, he said.

Some intelligence experts believe Mr. Shadrin is alive in the Soviet Union. However, Soviet press accounts have blamed the CIA for murdering him, a charge not likely to have been made if he were alive, experts say.

World War II Spies Plan Symposium on O.S.S.

By IRVIN MOLOTSKY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10 After 40 years, some of America's grand old spies are preparing to come in from the cold. They want to tell their story before it is too late.

The people involved were part of the Office of Strategic Services, the nation's first organized nonmilitary espionage and sabotage agency, which came into being in World War II and was a forerunner to today's Central Intelligence Agency.

In particular, these former undercover comrades want to shine up the somewhat disputed image of their leader of those days, Gen. William J. Donovan, and they want to rebut some recent assertions that the best spies in the war were British, not American. To that end, some of them are to meet here in the next two weeks to plan for a symposium in the spring at which they will attempt to spread on the record the accomplishments of the O.S.S. and the contributions of Wild Bill Donovan, who died in 1959. If things go well, they then hope to compile a written record of the O.S.S.

"We feel Donovan has been maligned a little," said a former O.S.S. official and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Ray Cline. "There has been an emphasis on his

being a cowboy, while others of us think he was more a scholar, a temperamental, romantic type figure, but with a shrewd understanding of Washington politics."

Another old intelligence hand, Max Corvo, publisher of a weekly newspaper in Middletown, Conn., says former O.S.S. operatives particularly want to rebut an assertion by Bradley F. Smith in his book "The Shadow Warriors" that the O.S.S. accomplished little and that the really successful spies were the British agents.

Age Is the Enemy Now

Mr. Corvo says it is especially important that the surviving O.S.S. veterans now get a chance to tell their

story because age is doing what enemy agents did not to the 25,000 people who served in the agency before it was abolished shortly after the war. "Most of our people are in their 70's," he said. "During the last five years, I have been to several meetings and you can see that time has taken its toll."

The O.S.S. was started after Pearl Harbor when President Roosevelt asked General Donovan, a hero in World War I, to set up an agency separate from the military's intelligence services. Participants in the symposium will be asked to bring with them evidence of all that happened thereafter, for lots of things are missing from the files although the secrecy protections were taken off 2,000 cubic feet of archives last summer.

Notes Will Be Sought

"It is my contention that a lot of members took some documents with them, probably as mementoes," Mr. Corvo said. "We are going to call on them to make any notes they made available."

The people scheduled to meet here for the planning session include Mr. Corvo; William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as two former C.I.A. directors, William Colby and Richard Helms; Mr. Cline, now a professor at Georgetown University, and Michael Burke, who once ran the New York Yankees, the New York Knicks and the New York Rangers.

Mr. Casey said: "The O.S.S. activities against Germany and Japan were really the genesis of today's American intelligence service, and it is an important and interesting story. It would be a worthwhile thing to put it together from the historical point of view."

Mr. Helms, now a consultant, said of the O.S.S. history project: "The goal is a more balanced description. It is a very ambitious project, and whether it is going to fly is something else. Look at the calendar and you'll see that most people who served in the O.S.S. are no longer children."

He Learned Linotype Italian

Mr. Corvo, at 65 years old, is one of the younger veterans. He got involved as a spy in Italy, he said, because he had learned idiomatic Italian as a youth by setting type at his father's newspaper, then *Il Bollettino*, which has since been converted into *The Bulletin*, a weekly paper published in Italian and English.

Mr. Cline said: "At 67, they consider me one of the younger guys. The feeling of the old O.S.S. crowd is that we are going to die off soon. If someone doesn't capture Bill Donovan and those times, it's going to be lost. It behooves us to get our act together."

When they get together, will they remember each others' agent numbers, as in 007 for James Bond? Mr. Donovan was 109 and Allen Dulles, later to head the C.I.A., 110.

STAT



Drawings by Redinger

Ex-officials' foreign advocacy hit

By Myron Struck
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Two House Democrats charged yesterday that numerous former government officials from the Reagan, Carter and previous administrations are making a mockery of U.S. trade policy by having surrendered their public positions for the lucrative role of foreign lobbyist.

Reps. Howard Wolpe of Michigan and Marcy Kaptur of Ohio claimed that the insider's knowledge of American interests these individuals gained while on the public payroll is being siphoned to sometimes hostile trading partners.

"The typical foreign agent of the 1980s is a representative of foreign commercial interests at a time when the United States is experiencing a \$150 billion trade deficit with the world," said Miss Kaptur. "Current federal laws are insufficient in regulating [these] activities." The two House members asked the General Accounting Office to review current practices, and introduced a bill titled the Foreign Agents Compulsory Ethics in Trade Act (FACE IT), which would prohibit high-level officials from working for a foreign interest for 10 years after leaving federal service.

A list compiled by congressional

aides shows 17 former key government officials are on the foreign agents register at the Department of Justice, including two former CIA directors — William Colby, who according to the list, now represents Japan, Brazil, Thailand and Singapore, and Richard Helms, who now represents Iran.

Mr. Colby and Mr. Helms could not be reached for comment, but most of those on the list who were contacted said the legislation was unnecessary.

"People around this town behave with discretion when they consider using something learned within the United States government to [help] a subsequent private-sector client," said William D. Rogers, a former undersecretary of state for economic affairs.

Mr. Rogers, who now represents the government of Brazil's finance ministry on the restructuring of that country's foreign debt, said a "further tightening of the law would make it much more difficult to attract people into public service."

The list includes former National Security Adviser Richard Allen, now representing Japan; former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, Mexico; former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Strauss, Japan and China; Paul Warnke, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mexico and Australia.

BOSTON GLOBE

7 November 1985

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Yurchenko's re-defection raises interesting theories

By Fred Kaplan
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON - The case of Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet defector who reversed himself and returned to the Soviet Union yesterday, raises several questions.

How did Yurchenko, the 5th highest-ranking official in the KGB and thus a valuable intelligence asset, elude his CIA escorts? Why did he re-defect to the Soviet Union? Was his initial defection to the West genuine, or was it the first step of an elaborate deception by the KGB? And if the latter, what might have motivated such an operation?

Yurchenko defected to the US embassy in Rome last July. In September, he reportedly revealed details about Soviet spying to the CIA. On Monday, Yurchenko surprised the US intelligence community by appearing at the Soviet embassy here and claiming that he had not defected voluntarily, that the CIA had kidnapped, drugged and tortured him.

The State Department has called Yurchenko's story "completely false."

How Yurchenko escaped his CIA supervisors is not yet clear. Monday, Yurchenko said he had been kept in total isolation and had broke away during a "a momentary lapse" in security.

On the other hand, intelligence officials have said Yurchenko was dining with his CIA escort at a restaurant in Washington's Georgetown section Saturday night, got up, said he would return shortly, and disappeared.

Conversation reported

[ABC News yesterday reported that Yurchenko asked his dining companion: "What would you do if I walked out? Would you shoot me?"]

["No, of course not," the CIA escort reportedly said. "We don't treat defectors that way."]

[Yurchenko departed, reportedly saying, "If I'm not back in 15 minutes, don't blame yourself."]

Legislators have criticized the CIA for keeping loose reins on such a heavyweight find. However, his easy escape is neither implausible nor inconsistent with agency practices. Several Soviet defectors have been allowed out of isolation a short time after their case officers deemed them genuine and reliable.

Says former CIA director William Colby, "You really have to begin treating the guy like a normal person. You can't keep him in prison. There are very clear rules on this."

In fact, the rules resulted from the case of Yuri Nosenko, another senior KGB official who defected to the West in 1962. Because some of Nosenko's information conflicted with that of a previous KGB defector, and because the previous defector was much favored by senior CIA

counterintelligence officers, Nosenko was kept in isolation for 3½ years and repeatedly questioned by interrogators who suspected he had been sent by Moscow to purvey disinformation. Even under this pressure, Nosenko never changed his story, and was finally released.

In the mid-1970s, the case was reviewed, interrogation procedures were changed, and several counterintelligence officers were fired.

Why Yurchenko ultimately decided to return is another mystery. Says Colby, "There have been lots of defectors who have chosen to go home. There's nothing new about that." Even so, very rarely has someone as highly ranked as Yurchenko made the turnaround.

One possible theory

A leading theory, provided by CIA officials, is that Yurchenko had a girlfriend in Canada, the wife of a Soviet diplomat, who he thought would also defect to be with him. When she refused, he despaired, began to miss his family, and tried to undo what was looking more and more like a big mistake.

Another possibility concerns Yurchenko's 16-year-old son, still in the Soviet Union. If Yurchenko was in fact allowed to move about a bit, it is not unlikely that Soviet officials "got to him," says one US intelligence official. "They could have said, 'If you stay in the US, your son has no career, no job, no future. If you come back and go around telling everyone that your experience in the West was horrible, we'll give your son a nice job, we'll give you an income, maybe a dacha somewhere.' "

Once such hypotheses as these are considered, the possibilities for intrigue become endless. Could Moscow have planned the whole enterprise? Could Yurchenko have been told to pretend to defect, give the West some important - but not vital - material, and then re-defect, denouncing the CIA and proclaiming he was treated inhumanely?

Some, including President Reagan, suspect this might have happened. Colby, among others, doubts it, saying, "I don't think they'd use a senior officer for something like this."

If the Yurchenko affair was a ploy, the intent would have been twofold, said one former intelligence officer: "It would make the next guy who was planning to defect think twice before going. And it would make the United States less willing to believe his credentials if he did defect."

Interestingly, he said, even if the Yurchenko case was not a Soviet setup, the effect may be exactly the same.

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6 November 1985

FILE ONLY

Yurchenko Case Leaving CIA With Black Eye

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By DOYLE McMANUS,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Whether Vitaly Yurchenko was a brilliant Soviet agent or merely a confused and homesick man, the KGB officer's sudden decision to return to Moscow has given the CIA an aching black eye, Reagan Administration officials and members of Congress said Tuesday.

Senior administration officials insisted that Yurchenko could not have learned much about U.S. intelligence operations during his three months of interrogation.

"He gave us stuff; we didn't give him anything," Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said. "There wasn't the slightest damage to us."

But former CIA officials and members of the Senate Intelligence Committee said the KGB man undoubtedly learned some U.S. secrets that will be valuable to Moscow, although the degree of damage has not yet been fully assessed.

Warning for Others

Perhaps more important, one former U.S. spy said, the KGB will use the strange saga of Vitaly Yurchenko to warn other potential defectors that "anyone who even thinks of putting his life on the line depending on the professionalism of U.S. intelligence organizations had better forget it."

While U.S. officials dismissed as absurd Yurchenko's charge that the CIA kidnapped, drugged and tortured him, the incident nevertheless complicates President Reagan's effort to raise human rights issues at his summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev in less than two weeks.

"The damage which may have been intended, if there was any, is in giving them a kind of talking point to try to embarrass the United States in a particularly important time," Weinberger conceded.

And the CIA's apparent bungling of the case exposed some of the agency's most secret operations and methods—and its managers' competence—to unwelcome public scrutiny.

"You're assured that the CIA knows what they're doing," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. "That's an assumption that's now being questioned.

"Other than walking away with our credibility and our national honor, I don't see him walking away with a great deal," he said wryly.

Leahy and Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), the panel's chairman, said they plan a full investigation of the CIA's handling of Yurchenko and will summon intelligence director William J. Casey for questioning.

According to U.S. officials, Yurchenko, the KGB officer in charge of Soviet espionage operations in North America, defected last July by walking into the U.S. Embassy in Rome. They said Yurchenko voluntarily submitted to extensive CIA debriefings and provided valuable information about Soviet spying.

But on Monday, Yurchenko surfaced inside the Soviet Embassy in Washington and told reporters that he had been kidnaped on the streets of Rome and held captive by the CIA until he managed to escape Saturday night.

Most intelligence experts said an apparent defector like Yurchenko should not have learned much about CIA operations in Moscow—at least, not if his American interrogators were careful. But he would clearly have learned a great deal about the CIA's methods in handling defectors, information that could be useful to the KGB in either planting false defectors or recapturing real ones.

"In talking to him, we would be careful in protecting the identities of our people (in the Soviet Union)," former CIA chief William E. Colby said. "We wouldn't be talking about our operations—we would ask him about theirs. . . . We would be very cautious about what we would tell him or let him know, particularly in three months."

Former Deputy Director George Carver was less sanguine.

"It's aggravating. It shouldn't have happened," he said. "It is going to provide the KGB with a lot of details about agency practices and locations of safehouses and other information you would just as soon the KGB didn't have."

"More damaging is the KGB's message to their own people that anybody who is thinking about leaving Mother Russia had better

forget it, because our arm is very long and we will get you back," Carver said. "Also, anyone who even thinks of putting his life on the line depending on the professionalism of U.S. intelligence organizations had better forget it—the U.S. talks a better intelligence game than it plays. That image is a lot easier to get than it is to get rid of."

Much of the debate over the amount of damage Yurchenko did turns on the unresolved question whether he was a genuine defector who had a change of heart, or a deliberate KGB "plant" who buffeted the CIA's counterintelligence branch for three months.

The experts remained divided on that issue. On the Senate committee, Republican Durenberger said he agrees with the CIA's contention that the Russian was "a very troubled man"; Democrat Leahy said he had "a nagging and persistent feeling" that Yurchenko was a phony.

Either way, however, Congress planned to call Casey and his aides for questioning—a process that will inevitably expose the agency to closer public scrutiny of its operations and management than the CIA chief likes. The case has already subjected the intelligence agency to more public criticism of its competence in basic spycraft than any operation since congressional investigations of the mid-1970s revealed bungled assassination plots and other scandals.

"If it turns out that he was a double agent, then, of course, there was a great problem and a grave mistake," Leahy said. "If he was a real defector, the question is why

was he out having dinner just a short distance from Mount Alto (the Soviet Embassy compound), and he just walked off."

"They ought never to have let it be known that they had him and they should not have let things dribble out into the press about what he was telling them," said Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), a former member of the Intelligence Committee. "That's the kind of self-promotion that an intelligence agency very wisely avoids."

"It was as unprofessional as you can get," charged a former top CIA official who refuses to allow himself ever to be quoted by name. "It's a basic problem of management over there."

Durenberger and Carver warned that some of the criticism may be undeserved.

"You've got to keep in mind that something like one out of every two defectors goes home," the Senate chairman said.

"The sun will still rise in the east and set in the west," said Carver. "There is going to be some obvious embarrassment in the CIA, and some people will raise some questions about the professional competence of their colleagues—perhaps unfairly."

Yurchenko's turnabout failed to cause any clear damage in one area: the preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva later this month. Secretary of State George P. Shultz discussed the affair briefly with Gorbachev during their meeting in Moscow on Tuesday, but aides indicated it did not disrupt the discussions.

One U.S. intelligence official said

Yurchenko appeared to steer away from accusing Reagan of wrongdoing in his dramatic news conference Monday—"so it's not embarrassment they're trying to accomplish."

In any case, the White House official said, "We won't be provoked into anything that could cause problems leading up to the summit, whether or not that's what the Soviets want to do."

"We are proceeding with our preparations for the meeting," State Department spokesman Charles Redman said. "We already have stated our desire that President Reagan's meeting with (Communist Party) General Secretary Gorbachev should set an agenda for more productive U.S.-Soviet relations in the coming years. . . . We do not believe that the Yurchenko case should affect these plans."

Times staff writers Maury Dolan and James Gerstenzang contributed to this report.

Experts dispute meaning of KGB officer's return

By Ernest B. Furgurson
and Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — The spectacular redefection of Soviet spy Vitaly Yurchenko upset official Washington yesterday, with one expert saying the turnabout "leaves a lot of people with a lot of egg on their faces in the intelligence community."

"This could take a long time to repair," said a former senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But other intelligence professionals minimized Mr. Yurchenko's surprise decision, maintaining that information disclosed in his three months under questioning made the whole exchange a net plus for the United States.

At the Capitol, key Democrats said the incident had shaken legislators' confidence in the CIA and its director, William J. Casey. Mr. Casey had personally vouched that Mr. Yurchenko was a bona fide defector, according to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Leahy said the reversal might have damaged U.S. intelligence operations. "The concern is very real that the man is a double agent, was a double agent and always was," he said.

But a White House official responded by saying, "There's no feeling that someone screwed up."

Two former CIA directors and some other specialists largely discounted suggestions that Mr. Yurchenko might have been a "plant," assigned by Moscow to embarrass the U.S. side by faking a defection and then pretending to change his mind.

They also doubted that the startling switch in the Yurchenko case had any relation to the forthcoming summit meeting between President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Richard Helms, CIA chief from 1965 to 1973, said it was "unlikely" that the KGB would have sent a high-ranking officer like Mr. Yurchenko to dupe its American competitors. "If you did that, you wouldn't send along somebody who knows all your best secrets," he said.

William E. Colby, who ran the agency from 1973 to 1976, agreed. Both men also said such a change of heart was not an uncommon event in intelligence work.

"This sort of thing happens every now and then," Mr. Colby said. "People defect and then decide to go back because they can't stand the psychological strain of separation from their old life."

"Mr. Casey should get praise rather than criticism for the net results of the Yurchenko venture."

Mr. Colby noted that the KGB had lost three senior officers by defection in recent months. If that happened to the CIA "we'd be in an uproar," he added. "Instead, we've lost some tawdry little spies being paid a few thousand dollars. It's not the same thing at all."

Harry Rositzke, who spent 20 years as a CIA specialist in Soviet operations and counterintelligence, said, "There's no reason whatsoever to think Yurchenko was a plant. If you plant somebody, you do it for a purpose. You don't send somebody with a lot of classified information in his head."

George Carver, former deputy director of the agency, acknowledged that the episode was obviously an intelligence embarrassment and "it's obviously awkward." He was the man who said it left intelligence officials with "egg on their faces."

On balance, however, the KGB's recent troubles outweigh those of the CIA, he suggested. Mr. Yurchenko's assertions that he was kidnapped and drugged were "scripted by the Soviets," he said. "It's not that we are incapable of evil and people don't do stupid things, but nobody would do anything that stupid in this day of oversight committees and the press."

But there was more suspicion in Congress, where Mr. Leahy said, "There are an awful lot of angry senators in both parties on this matter. . . . I'm one of them."

He said many of his colleagues had had strong doubts about the authenticity of the Yurchenko defection, and had been assured by Mr. Casey. "You assume the CIA knows what they're doing," the senator said. "That's an assumption that's now being questioned."

Allen E. Goodman, a former CIA analyst now at Georgetown University, also said he thought Mr. Yurchenko had been "lying from the beginning, probably a plant to embarrass the U.S. at a summit where human rights will be discussed."

Rather than seeing Mr. Yurchenko's switch as a CIA failure, he said the agency might have suspected he was a plant and intentionally gave him the opportunity to run back to Soviet custody.

Representative Bob Livingston, R-La., a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said the defection was "a legitimate deal gone sour. But we got a lot more than we gave," he said. "We might have been lax, but we weren't wrong."

Assessing damage to the CIA, Mr. Carver said that any Soviet agent considering defection now probably would have doubts about coming to the American side. "The KGB has shown its arm is very long and that the United States — well, don't believe their promises of supporting you. . . . This could take a long time to repair."

Some observers believed Mr. Yurchenko might have decided to go back home after reading in the U.S. press about disclosures he reportedly made to the CIA. One was about Edward Howard, a CIA officer who may have tipped off the KGB about a Russian working for the CIA in Moscow and who then fled the United States before he could be arrested.

"Too much talk is deleterious," former CIA Director Helms said.

There also was speculation that Mr. Yurchenko's original defection might not have been ideological, but personal.

According to reports, Mr. Yurchenko, when stationed here earlier, had an affair with the wife of a colleague now posted in Canada. After defecting, he allegedly spoke with her. When she refused to resume the affair, he decided to redefect.

Asked about this version, a White House official said, "We have reason to believe there is something to it."

Correspondent Nancy J. Schweiher of The Sun's Washington Bureau contributed to this article.

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WASHINGTON POST
3 November 1985

For the Record

*From a speech at Ball State University
by John Brademas, president of New
York University and former U.S. senator,
on Oct. 24:*

Terrorism in the Middle East, conflict in Central America, the threat of civil war in the Philippines, tensions in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean—are all developments that reach far across international borders. In the present day, how well are we preparing Americans to understand other nations, other cultures, other peoples? In my view, we are not doing very well. . . .

The National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies found a serious lack in this country of experts on the cultures, economies and foreign policies of Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. . . . [Former CIA directors] William Colby and Stansfield Turner blamed our lack of expert knowledge about Vietnam and Iran for serious intelligence shortcomings in those countries. . . . The National Endowment for the Humanities has cited a sharp decline since 1966 in college entrance and graduation requirements in foreign languages. . . .

Whatever the reasons for the troubled state of international studies in this country, it seemed clear at one time that we were as a nation willing to take steps to overcome our ignorance. The Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 shocked us into a reevaluation of the quality of American education. Our response was the National Defense Education Act, an effort . . . to retain our international leadership in science and technology. Through Title VI of NDEA, we sought to strengthen our capabilities in foreign languages and area studies. I regret to say, however, that we have consistently failed to provide adequate funds for these programs.

KEENE SENTINEL (NH)
30 October 1985

Colby, ex-CIA chief, sees social, economic problems ahead

By TANI HURLEY
Sentinel Staff Writer

The most important international problems the world will face in the years ahead are social and economic rather than military, predicts William E. Colby, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Speaking at the Greater Keene Chamber of Commerce annual dinner at Keene State College Tuesday night, Colby reviewed the history of spying, beginning with spies Moses sent into Canaan, and then enumerated current world "hot spots."

Colby began his intelligence career during World War II, parachuting behind enemy lines to the French and Norwegian resistance forces. He was chief of the Far East Division of the CIA and in 1968 was named ambassador to South Vietnam.

He was director of the agency from 1973 to 1976.

Today, Colby told the Chamber audience, regional problems and subversion surface, but economic uncertainties underlie them all.

And now, the emphasis of this center of intelligence is analytical. "There are more doctors and masters on the payroll than on a university campus," he said. "They're the center of our intelligence system."

Gone, for the most part, are the days of "cloak and dagger" spying, Colby said. Describing himself as a real spy, Colby said many of the audience might be disappointed. "I've got gray hair and glasses. I'm wearing a suit. I might be another member of the Chamber of Commerce.

"We began to develop a different kind of intelligence after Pearl Harbor," Colby said. After the bombing occurred, officials in Washington discovered there was information "lying all over the place" to indicate what the Japanese had in mind.

And that was the problem: information was diffused and the agencies didn't communicate what they knew. That became the function of the Central Intelligence Agency.



Sentinel photo by RICHARD PRATT

William E. Colby, former head of CIA

After the war, it was difficult to find out what was going on in many areas of the world, so the agency's role shifted. "We turned to America's genius in science and technology. The result was an aircraft that flew higher and further than any before ... and brought home pictures," he said, including photos of nuclear missiles being installed in Cuba. The agency didn't rely on photographs alone, but corroborated the information with data provided by a Russian spy.

The cumulative package gave President John F. Kennedy ammunition for a confrontation with Soviet officials. "Khrushchev blinked — and they did remove the nuclear missiles," Colby said.

As the technology of spying changed, the government's attitude toward its role changed as well. Gone were the days when government would deny knowledge of spying activities.

Although Colby said a Congressional examination of CIA activity in 1974-1975 was "grossly exaggerated," it did show a determination to run the agency within the constitution. The agen-

cy worked out a system of control. There is, however, a continual delicate balance of releasing information without jeopardizing the source.

The president needs information gathered by the CIA to act, he said. "But the president can't operate without the Congress. Congress can't operate without their constituency. So the people need to know, too," he said. "But they don't and can't know the sources." And that sometimes creates tension.

Shifting from a review of the past to a prediction of the future, Colby said current talks with the Soviets about arms control could produce major moves.

While scientists might say production of the strategic defense initiative system, or Star Wars, isn't plausible in the near future, American ingenuity in the past has pushed technology beyond ex-

pected limits, he said.

So, concern about American defense capability is likely to get the Soviets to offer some concessions in weapons reduction. In turn, President Reagan will probably be able to offer some concessions on Star Wars.

Leaders on both sides at the Geneva talks scheduled later this year will be pressed for action, Colby said. Although those talks may not produce solutions, "I think you will be looking toward another summit in a year," Colby said.

Colby also made his forecasts for other world hot spots:

□ The struggle in South Africa will continue as both sides in the racial confrontation hold to their positions. The tension will increase, but the situation won't get out of control, Colby said, be-

cause the government has the means to control violence.

"The main action (for change) will take place in stockholders' meetings and boardrooms," he said. "It's not going to change in South Africa."

□ In Central and South America, the balance of power is changing, Colby said. But in Nicaragua, he doesn't expect the contra forces to overthrow the Sandanista government. The United States' relationship with that area will be paralyzed for a long time.

In areas of concern, it is the role of the United States intelligence network to gather information, Colby said. "The purpose is to enable us to understand other countries and problems to solve them."

The Morison Trial Provokes a Constitutional Argument

When Secrets Are Passed to the Press

By ROBIN TONER

WASHINGTON — In his quiet gray suit, with his professorial air and patrician background, Samuel Loring Morison seemed an unlikely defendant in an espionage trial as he sat in Federal district court in Baltimore over the last two weeks.

This was no classic spy scenario, with a surreptitious passing of defense information to foreign agents. Mr. Morison, a former naval intelligence analyst, was being tried on espionage and theft charges for giving classified photographs to a British defense magazine. And when he was convicted Thursday, some legal experts said the law had taken a dangerous turn.

Most vocal was the American Civil Liberties Union, which assisted Mr. Morison in his defense and long portrayed his prosecution as a perilous assault on the First Amendment. The threat of such prosecutions, the union argued, will give the Government new power over what information can be published, and the debate on national security issues will be chilled. Among journalists, there was talk that the Administration would use the espionage statutes to plug leaks.

Benno Schmidt Jr., dean of Columbia Law School, sounded a similar concern. "If the Government's legal position in this case is accepted," he said, "we have an official secrets act in the United States under which any Government employee revealing defense-related information to the press could be severely punished.

"Such a construction of the espionage statutes is fundamentally at odds with 50 years of consistent legislative history."

The Justice Department dismissed such concerns as unfounded. "For the life of me, it's very mysterious to see all the arm-waving going on,"

said Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the department's Criminal Division.

Mr. Trott said the A.C.L.U. was "attributing to us motives that are simply nonexistent." The Justice Department did not seek out this case as part of some agenda or program, he said. But he added: "It is our sincere hope that this reminds people that classified information cannot be leaked."

The only previous espionage prosecution involving a disclosure to the press was that of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, in the case involving the Pentagon Papers. Charges against those men were dismissed on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.

The trial of Mr. Morison revolved largely around three photographs, produced by a KH-11 reconnaissance satellite, showing a Soviet vessel under construction at a Black Sea shipyard. The photographs are of striking clarity although a senior Central Intelligence Agency official testified that one of them had been taken from a distance of 500 miles.

The technology demonstrated by those photographs was at the heart of the Government's case against Mr. Morison. Witnesses for the prosecution testified that the pictures could have provided the Soviet Union with valuable insights into the KH-11 program. The

defense emphasized that KH-11 photographs had been released twice before, and that the Soviet Union already had a copy of a technical manual for the satellite system, sold to it in 1978 by a former C.I.A. employee.

While Mr. Morison did not take the stand, his persona, as defined by prosecution and defense, dominated the trial. From the prosecution came the image of a man dissatisfied with his job at the National Intelligence Support Center in Suitland, Md., eager to join the staff of Jane's Defence Weekly, and thus willing to give them information to strengthen his candidacy.

The defense portrayed Mr. Morison as a patriotic man who gave Jane's the photographs not for any personal gain, but rather to inform the public about the extent of the Soviet military buildup. In giving information to the press, he had engaged in a routine governmental practice, the defense attorneys argued.

A Troubling Case?

Morton H. Halperin, director of the Washington area office of the A.C.L.U., said he was surprised at the lack of outrage at Mr. Morison's plight. Attorneys for Mr. Morison said the verdict would be appealed, and Mr. Halperin said his group would "try to get people to understand what is at stake here."

Floyd Abrams, a New York attorney who specializes in constitutional issues, contended that the A.C.L.U. was not exaggerating the import of the case. "By its expansive definition of what constitutes espionage," he said, "the Morison case is troubling and indeed dangerous, not only for those who occasionally provide information in an unauthorized way, but also to the press and the public."

But William E. Colby, a former Director of Central Intelligence, offered a different perspective. The Morison case may make the job of the press more difficult by stemming the release of classified information, he said, but "we've got to do something to pull up our socks here and put a little discipline back in the Government."

Mr. Morison, the grandson of Samuel Eliot Morison, the naval historian, is to be sentenced Nov. 25. He faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and \$10,000 in fines for each of the four counts of which he was convicted.